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ASSIGNMENT OF FUTURE INVENTIONS
Harold M. Knoth*
i LLUSTRATIVE of a situation quite likely to develop from the re-
lationship of employer and employee is the factually com-
plicated maze revealed in the Illinois case of Velsicol Corpora-
tion v. Hyman.' The corporation plaintiff there concerned en-
deavored to compel the defendant, one of its officers and execu-
tive head of its research work, to specifically perform an alleged
agreement to assign to the corporation certain pending patent
applications covering processes discovered by him during the
course of his employment. The suit failed for the reason that
the plaintiff was (1) unable to show that the purported express
agreement was ever signed by defendant, or (2) if so signed, was
unable to give adequate proof to explain its failure to produce
the signed contract. A claim that an implied agreement existed,
growing out of defendant's conduct in making prior assignments
of other discoveries as well as from the fiduciary relationship
present between the parties, likewise failed. Much of the diffi-
culty present in that case would have been eliminated had the
employer been able to produce a formal contract executed by
the parties. It should not be supposed, however, that the pres-
ence of such a contract would guarantee success to the employer
whose employee has developed a patentable invention, for there
is room for pitfalls even in the most skilfully devised contractual
language.
The purpose of this paper is not so much to re-examine the
general law on the subject but to collate and compare specific
cases involving so-called employment contracts for the purpose
of determining somewhat the extent to which the parties may go
in the accomplishment of their intents and purposes. In some
* LL.B. Member, Illinois and Iowa bars. Registered Patent Attorney. Much
of the material herein previously appeared in a paper by the author published in
Vol. 31, Journal of the Patent Office Society, pp. 532-43 (1949), Permission to
reprint has been granted by that journal.
1338 Ill. App. 52, 87 N. E. (2d) 35 (1949). Niemeyer, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. It is understood that leave to appeal has been granted.
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respects, an agreement by which an employee agrees to de-
vote his time to the making of inventions and improvements
for his employer, in exchange for employment and wages or other
remuneration, is similar to an agreement by which a person or
company purchases an invention and seeks to acquire some form
of protective interest in possible improvements on that inven-
tion. Although there may be fine distinctions between the two
types of cases, and although slightly different rules may be de-
veloped on the basis of the seller's or inventor's future interest
in the enterprise, whether as partner, promoter, official, owner, or
the like, it will be seen that the principles are very much the
same and as easy to apply in one case as in the other.
I. IN GXNERAL
The general rules governing contracts to assign future in-
ventions undoubtedly follow ordinary contract law that controls
in any case involving agreements to regulate competition, such
as commonly arise in situations where an employee leaves his
employer to seek his fortune alone but in the same or a re-
lated field. As a broad proposition, contracts that are unreason-
able are unenforcible; that is, if the restraints imposed are un-
limited as to time, space or subject matter. The importation of
this rule of reasonableness into the relatively limited field of the
types of agreements considered here, has resulted from a slavish
acceptance of, and adherence to subsequent interpretations of,
the opinion in Littlefield v. Perry;2 although that case does not
actually strike down a contract. Be that as it may, the principle
is sound and has been accepted by authoritative texts. 3  Since
the very nature of the beast requires administration by a court
of equity, the several ramifications and characteristics likely to
develop from individual cases will be made to appear below.
2 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 205, 22 L. Ed. 577 (1875).
3 See, for example, Walker on Patents (Deller's Ed., Baker, Voorhis & Co., New
York, 1937), § 345.
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II. PECULIAR MIScELANEous CHARACTERISTICS
Although an assignment agreement that is so broad as to be
unreasonable or repugnant to public policy has been rather freely
stated elsewhere to be unenforcible, a court of equity will,
in general, give effect to such agreements as a requisite to the
protection of the employer's business. 4 And a proper agree-
ment will be specifically enforced to require the assignment to
the employer of relevant patents and applications and to enjoin
the employee from conduct calculated to injure his former em-
ployer.5 Nevertheless, it is said,6 the contract should be clear
and the acts alleged to have occurred or failed to occur under
it should be convincing.7 If the agreement is good in part only,
and is divisible under the usual rules, the court may give effect
to the unoffensive part.8
Obviously such an agreement must be supported by a val-
uable consideration, but it need not involve a separate grant as
would be required for transfer of a patent or a business.9 Sal-
ary paid to the employee is sufficient and, unless the contract
calls for further payment, he is entitled to nothing more. 10 A
failure on the part of the employer to make or tender perform-
ance precisely at the time and place required will not defeat
his right to have the agreement specifically performed;" al-
though, obviously, the employer's default may be effective to
free the employee.1
2
4 Dry Ice Corp. v. Josephson, 43 F. (2d) 408 (1930); Conway v. White, 9 F.
(2d) 863 (1925); Wege v. Safe-Cabinet Co., 249 F. 696 (1918). The mere fact
that such litigation involves a patent naturally does not confer jurisdiction on a
federal court: Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 205, 22 L. Ed. 577 (1875).
5 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F. (2d) 353 (1928).
6 Walker, op. cit., § 345.
7 Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F. (2d) 385 (1934), cert. den. 294 U.
S. 711, 55 S. Ct. 506, 79 L. Ed. 1245 (1935).
8 Idem.
9 Lion Tractor Co. v. Bull Tractor Co., 231 F. 156 (1916).
10 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulator Co., 266 U. S. 342, 45 S.
Ct. 117, 69 L. Ed. 316 (1924), affirming 288 F. 330 (1923).
lI-Conway v. White, 9 F. (2d) 863 (1925). The employer therein became bank-
rupt, but assignment was nevertheless compelled.
12Brown Perfection Tube Co. v. Brown, 233 F. 676 (1916).
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The agreement need not be in writing, if other conditions
are met,13 hence it may be either express or implied;' 4 the par-
ties' understanding thereof being evidenced by the fact that the
employee has previously made assignments to his employer. 15
These principles, as well as those hereafter stated, are applicable
to the United States government and its employees, 16 as well as
to other persons.
Attempts of employees to circumvent such agreements have
been as ingenious as they have been numerous. They have not
succeeded by attempting to treat the agreement as a species of
option to the employer to purchase the inventions. 17  Nor may
the employee so bound make related inventions for third per-
sons. 18  If the employee, after the termination of his employ-
ment, secures a patent including other inventions in addition to
those rightly belonging to his former employer, he may be treated
as one who has wrongfully commingled goods, in this case ideas,
and the burden is on him to establish a contrary situation in his
favor.' 9 On the other hand, a contract will not be construed to
prevent an inventor, after severance of his employment, from
making similar inventions for another, in the absence of conflict
with reasonable provisions of the contract. 20
He may not defend on the ground that the contract contains
no provision for future assignment of patents covering included
inventions, for such covenant will be implied,2' but the employer
may, at any time, release the employee from his contract, either
13 Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 16 F. (2d) 739 (1927),
cert. den. 274 U. S. 740, 47 S. Ct. 586, 71 L. Ed. 1320 (1927).
14 U. S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178 and 706, 53 S. Ct. 554 and
687, 77 L. Ed. 513 and 1462 (1933).
15 Bowers v. Woodman, 59 F. (2d) 797 (1932). See also Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Miller, 22 F. (2d) 353 (1928).
16 U. S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178 and 706, 53 S. Ct. 554 and
687, 77 L. Ed. 513 and 1462 (1933).
17 Hebbard v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co., 161 F. (2d) 339 (1947).
18 New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F. (2d) 277 (1934). See also Conway
v. White, 9 F. (2d) 863 (1925), concerning the commingling thereof with inven-
tions made before employment.
19 New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F. (2d) 277 (1934).
20 Idem.
21 Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 205, 22 L. Ed. 577 (1875) ; Wege v.
Safe-Cabinet Co., 249 F. 696 (1918).
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generally or for isolated instances, and that release may be
either express or implied.22
An agreement requiring the assignment of future inven-
tions, even though valid, is not such an instrument as, by statute,
is entitled to recording in the Patent Office, 23 so the recording
thereof does not operate as constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser. 24
It seems that the respective rights of the parties should be
originally formulated by a proper bi-lateral contract, but in one
case, that of New Jersey Zinc Company v. Singmaster,2 5 no ob-
jections were raised to the enforcement of printed instructions
issued to employees subsequent to their employment.
III. PERMISSIBI. SCoPE
The foregoing has covered briefly the general principles de-
veloped by the courts in the application of ordinary law to agree-
ments pertaining to future inventions. There remains for con-
sideration only the requisites of such agreements as to subject
matter-the nature of the inventions involved, and time-the
period covered by the contract.
A. AS TO SUBJTECT MATTER
It follows from the general rule regarding the unenforcibility
of assignments in gross, that the invention or class of invention
must be kept within or related to the subject matter of the agree-
ment to the extent that such subject matter is either a specific type
of invention or machine or a particular business. In Aspinwall
v. McGill,26 for example, the assignment as to future inventions
and improvements was properly related to the invention ini-
22 Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Allen, 231 Mich. 69, 203 N. W. 890 (1924), wherein
the company evinced no interest in the employee's invention, though solicited, until
the employee -had negotiated elsewhere.
2335 U. S. C. A. §47.
24 Eastern Dynamite Co. v. Keystone Powder Mfg. Co., 164 F. 47 (1908).
25 71 F. (2d) 277 (1934). The text of the printed instructions is set out in the
appendix hereto, Case I.
26 32 F. 697 (1887).
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tially purchased, so the court could find no attempt to mortgage
the brain of the inventor. In other cases dealing strictly with
the inventions of employees, no case has been found in which
an objection has been successfully raised against language in
the contract defining the subject matter in terms of its relation
to the employer's present business 27 or to business or matters
in which he may be concerned. 28 Obviously, and as a matter of
common sense, an employer would not be expected to limit the
agreement to a specific line of products. Likewise, it would not
be expected that, under general language in such agreement, he
could properly become "interested or concerned" in a new and
unrelated field after and simply because a bound employee made
a valuable invention in such new field. Further, the agreement
is not invalid as to subject matter if it embraces processes, ap-
paratus, and the like, as well as products or machines. 29
B. AS TO TIME
This phase of the consideration herein may appear to over-
lap somewhat the consideration as to subject matter, especially
in so far as it relates to inventions already made. But, since it
concerns the time of making the invention, it is thought to be
properly classified here, as will be seen. In general, inventions
as to time may be made (1) before, (2) during, or (3) subse-
quent to the period of employment.
In at least four cases, the agreement covered inventions "now
known," ' 30 or "made" ' 31 by the employee. In the United Air-
craft cases, 32 the question as to inventions "now known" to
27 See Appendix, Cases A, B, C, D, G, H, and K.
28 Appendix, Cases E and J. Contra: Case L.
29 Appendix, Cases G, H, J, and K.
80 Appendix, Case J.
31 Appendix, Cases B, C, and K.
32 United Aircraft Products Co. v. Warrick, 79 Ohio App. 165, 72 N. E. (2d) 669
(1945) ; United Aircraft Products Co. v. Cruzan, 76 Ohio App. 540, 62 N. E. (2d)
763 (1945). These related cases involved inventors who, originally employed with-
out contract, were ultimately brought under contract. They had made an invention
in the interim. It was determined that the invention came under the contract
since it was "known" at the time of the execution of the contract. See also A. B.
Dick v. Fuller, 198 F. 404 (1912).
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the employee was squarely presented, and in both cases it was
held that the phrase meant inventions known to the employee
at the time of the making of the agreement.
Since the main purpose of an agreement for the assignment
of future inventions is to secure to the employer the requisite
rights in and to inventions made on his time and with his ma-
terial and by virtue of the employment, no one has questioned
his right to inventions made during the period or term of the
employment, and every contract will contain this or similar lan-
guage. 3
The most sensitive phase of the time aspect of such agree-
ments is that involving strictly "future" inventions; that is, in-
ventions conceived or made subsequent to the term of employ-
ment. Since it may be expected that an inventor cannot open
and close his mind like a book, many contracts include a provi-
sion extending the contract beyond the immediate employment
period for a certain length of time. In National Cash Register
Company v. Remington Arms Company,34 a provision extending
the contract for one year beyond the end of the employment was
said to be offensive. The point was not directly involved, how-
ever, and the remarks of the court are plainly dicta. A similar
provision was directly presented in the case of Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Company v. Miller35 and there found not to be objec-
tionable. In one other case, the employer attempted to extend
the contract for five years after the employment period but, the
subject matter of the contract being declared illegal, no consid-
eration was given to validity of the time provision.
36
33 Even in the absence of language limiting or relating the time of the invention
to the period of employment, the contract may be so construed by the court for
the purpose of taking it out of the broad prohibition of the general rule: Thibodeau
v. Hildreth, 124 F. 892 (1903), affirming 117 F. 146 (1903). The text of the con-
tract appears in Appendix, Case B.
34 242 N. Y. 99, 151 N. E. 144 (1926). See also, Appendix, Case F.
35 22 F. (2d) 353 (1928) ; Appendix, Case G.
36 Lanteen Laboratories, Inc. v. Clark, 294 Ill. App. 81, 13 N. E. (2d) 678 (1938).
The contract of employment, among other things, required the inventors to assign
during the employment period and for five years thereafter. Four years after
leaving the company's employ, the inventors filed an application on a device that
the company thought was within the contract. The trial court found, with the
aid of a patent attorney sitting as a special commissioner, that the invention
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On the basis of what has been set forth above, it appears
that the courts will uphold and enforce any proper and reason-
able contract in which the inventions covered are (1) made or
conceived prior to or in the course and during the time of em-
ployment or within a reasonable time thereafter, 7 and (2) re-
late to the particular or general business of the employer or to
the purpose for which the agreement was made.8
Although it has been shown above that such contracts have
not been declared improper because they included inventions
made before the period of employment39 and extended to in-
ventions relating to subject matter in which the employer "may"
become interested,4 0 neither provision is unequivocally recom-
mended in view of the decision in the case of Guth v. Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing Company.41 This case also places an
apparent limitation on a contract provision that was construed
to extend the employer's rights beyond the term of employment.
Yet, a close analysis of the decision reveals no real conflict
with the general principles outlined above. The late Judge Evans
decided the case on the basis that: (1) the agreement sought to
cover inventions made both before and after the period of em-
ployment; (2) the agreement could be extended to business of
the employer's predecessor or successor; (3) it sought to cover
subject matter in which the employer "may be concerned" in
the future; and (4) the contract could not be specifically en-
forced as long as the employee, upon a proper showing, could
not swear to the oath of the patent application.
of the applicants was not related under the contract and dismissed the bill. No
question was raised as to the five-year extension. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate
Court itself, and for the first time, raised the question of illegality of the subject
matter (birth control devices) and affirmed the decision dismissing the bill.
37 One year, for example: Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F. (2d) 353
(1928), and Appendix, Case G.
38 This much must be accepted, upon any reasonable construction of any such
agreement. It will be found that equivalent language appears throughout the
cases listed in the Appendix.
39 See Appendix, Cases B, C, and K.
40 See Appendix, Cases E and J. Contra: Case L.
4172 F. (2d) 385 (1934), cert. den. 294 U. S. 711, 55 S. Ct. 506, 79 L. Ed. 1245
(1935).
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Primarily, the contract was held bad to the extent that it
could be construed to require assignment of inventions "here-
after" made, and such construction was resorted to by the court
to support its declaration that, under this contract, "he was,
however, if he worked in another laboratory or for another
manufacturer, required to assign his discoveries to appellee.
This would effectively close the doors of employment to him."14 2
This absurd result is avoidable, however, by construing the pro-
vision in the light of the limiting phrase "during the period of
my employment," which is quite obviously the real meaning of
the provision, for "predecessor" and "successor" were used to
merely standardize the form of the contract for purposes of pos-
sible corporate reconstruction.
The decision does not validly establish the repugnance of the
phrase "or may be concerned" as related to subject matter,
since, as a practical matter, an employer, especially a corporate
employer, constantly adds new products to its business and if
the employee's invention is made after the adoption of such new
product and relates properly thereto, it should be included in the
agreement. A contrary result could require the execution of new
agreements with every expansion of the employer's business.
Ultimately, the court was satisfied that Guth could not make
the oath in the application in suit. Whether such satisfaction
was properly supported is beyond the scope of the present study.
It can be accepted, however, that that is the real basis for the
decision and the general criticism of the agreement was not re-
quired. It is interesting to note that of the authorities so copi-
ously4 3 cited by the court, only one4 4 actually held a contract
invalid as being contrary to public policy. The Guth case, then,
can stand for no more than the proposition that equity will not
compel an inventor to execute an oath for a patent application
42 72 F. (2d) 385 at 388.
43 One should not be unduly impressed by the sheer number of authorities cited,
for there are many duplications, some under the guise of parallel citations (c.f.
King v. Gannon, cited in note 3 as 158 N. E. 346 and in note 4 as 54 A. L. R.
1215), and others by separately including the appellate decision and the decision
affirmed (c.f. Thompson v. Automatic Fire Protection Co., 211 F. 120 and again
as 155 F. 548).
44 King v. Gannon, 261 Mass. 94, 158 N. E. 346, 54 A. L. R. 1215 (1927).
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where he properly shows that he believes himself not to be the
first inventor.
The case does not weaken the decisions in the United Air-
craft,45 Goodyear46 or Hebbard 47 cases, nor does it indicate that
the employment contracts therein are in any way defective or
susceptible to attack on the ground that they are unconscionable.
Further, the great weight of authority appears to be that such
contracts must indeed be bad to fail to elicit some response from
the court. Even the court in the Guth case would have enforced
what it said was the reasonable portion of that agreement.
APPENDIX OF AGREEMENTS*
1. NOT OBJECTIONABLE
A. Aspintwal Mfg. Co. v. McGill (Note 26).
Assignment of patent "together with all improvements
I may hereafter make, without further cost."
B. Thibodeau v. Hildreth (Note 33).
"... in consideration of such employment ...and ...
wages ... agree... that I will give ... full benefit and
enjoyment of any and all inventions or improvements
which I have made or may hereafter make relating to
machines or devices pertaining to said . . . business."
C. Wege v. Safe-Cabinet Co. (Notes 4, 21).
"all present and future improvements of the safe-cab-
inet" and "all developments and inventions embodying
any or all of the principles involved [therein] due in
part or altogether" to employee's "talent and labor"
saving to employee "full property rights in all patents
secured by him for inventions in steel or other construc-
tion, except as above stated . .
45 See note 32, ante.
4622 F. (2d) 353 (1928).
47 161 F. (2d) 339 (1947).
* Possible controversial language has been underscored for emphasis.
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D. Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Allen (Note 22).
"... all rights to . . . any inventions that I may here-
after make while in its employ, in the rust-proofing of
iron and steel . .. "
E. Contway v. White (Notes 4, 11, 18, 28, 40).
(... all invention.., made ... during the term of ...
employment, which in any way may affect any articles
manufactured by [employer] and used or capable of be-
ing used in [employer's] business..."
F. National Cash Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co. (Note 34).
Agreement required assignment of any invention made
during employment and within year after termination
of employment. Case contains dictum to effect that such
clause is offensive. Compare Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Miller (Appendix, Case G) and Guth v. Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co. (Appendix, Case L).
G. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller (Notes 5, 27, 29, 35, 46).
"... any and all improvements ... during . . . my em-
ployment ... or within one year from the termination of
my employment, in respect to: Methods, processes, or
apparatus concerned with the production of any charac-
ter of goods or materials sold or used by the . . . Com-
pany; or (2) in respect to such goods, etc., themselves."
H. Dry Ice Corp. v. Josephson (Note 4).
"... any inventions or processes which I may at any
time during the course and period of employment by the
[Company] evolve or create relating to Prest-Air de-
vices or Prest-Air Refrigeration, and in and to any pat-
ent rights in the United States or elsewhere, which I may
receive or to which I may be entitled by virtue of such
inventions or processes."
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New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster (Notes 18, 19, 20, 25).
General instructions issued to employees subsequent to
their employment read: "all patentable ideas and de-
vices originating with, or developed by, an employee of
this Company, while in the employ of the Company, shall
belong to the Company, and shall be assigned to the
Company by the patentee." Note: The inclusion of this
case in the group of cases held not objectionable should
not be construed to indicate general approval of the
practice of issuing such "instructions."
J. United Aircraft Products, Inc. v. Warrick; Same v. Cruzan
(Notes 28, 29, 30, 32, 45).
"... any and all inventions, discoveries or improvements
in any way relating to aircraft parts and accessories, or
other items of manufacture, manufactured and/or sold
by said company during the term of said employment, or
to processes or apparatus particularly adapted to the
manufacture of such parts, accessories or other items in-
vented by him during the term of said employment, or to
improvements on any such inventions whenever made
by him in the line of work or investigation which the
company is, or may be, engaged in during the term of
said employment, which . . . are now known to the [em-
ployee], or discovered or made by the [employee], either
in whole or in part, during the terms of said employ-
ment, shall immediately become the absolute property
of the company . . ."
K. Hebbard v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co. (Notes 17,
27, 29, 31, 47).
1"... any and all inventions, discoveries, machines, de-
vices, apparatus, processes or improvements to any there-
of, which I have made, discovered or invented, or which
I may hereafter make ... while in the employ of [and]
relating to the business of said company."
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I. OBJECTIONABLE
L. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. (Notes 7, 8, 28, 40, 41).
"(a) . . . all ... inventions which I have made or con-
ceived, or may at any time hereafter make or conceive
... relating to abrasives, adhesives or related materials,
or to any business in which said company during the pe-
riod of my employment by said company or by its prede-
cessors or successors in business is or may be concerned,
and (b) . . . inventions which, during the period of my
employment by said company or by its predecessors or
successors in business, I have made or conceived or may
hereafter make or conceive . . . or in the time or course
of such employment, or with the use of said company's
time, material or facilities, or relating to any subject
matter with which my said work for said company is or
may be concerned..."
